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Abstract 
 
Governments that privatize state industries often retain control over key distribution assets. 
While there are many examples of this form of partial privatization, to our knowledge there are 
no substantial quantitative studies of how governments use their control under these 
circumstances. In this paper we argue that the Russian government privatization of the oil sector 
during 1994-2003 is a useful case study because the federal government privatized oil production 
but retained monopoly control rights over the transport of crude onto world markets. Based on a 
simple analysis of the costs and benefits of control and ownership, we argue that that in these 
circumstances the federal government would use its control over transport capacity to provide 
privileged access to those companies over which it has influence. We find that in 2003 this is 
indeed the case and that this system detracted from economic efficiency.  In particular, private 
and regionally owned companies had to be much more productive than companies over which 
the federal government (the state) had influence to receive comparable access to world markets; 
state-influence companies had preferential access to routes with more capacity; and, the 
allocation of route capacity was sensitive to transport costs only in the state-influence sector.   
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1.   Introduction 
 
  Governments around the world have been privatizing large state owned enterprises in 
sectors that are of national strategic importance including oil, gas and electricity. Many of these 
privatizations have effectively been “partial” because national governments either manage to 
keep a major stake in the privatized companies or often retain control of a strategic distribution 
method even for fully privatized companies (Megginson, 2005).  For example, the state share is 
remarkably large in some local gas and oil giants including Petrobras in Brazil (32%), Eni in 
Italy (36.9%) and Sinopec in China (77.4%). In India, the generation of electricity has been 
privatized, but the transmission of electricity is monopolized by government electricity boards. It 
has been alleged that that Indian national government uses its control over transmission to force 
privatized generating companies to supply electricity to poor rural areas at  below-market prices 
and at high cost because there is poor transmission equipment and theft from the transmission 
lines in these rural areas (Smith, 1993).  
There has been a considerable body of work on how the state uses or abuses its powers in 
privatization programs where it manages to obtain substantial ownership positions in privatized 
companies (see Megginson, 2005 for a summary). However, there are not, to our knowledge, any 
quantitative studies of how governments behave in a partial privatization in which they retain 
control over strategic distribution assets. This is surprising since there are many examples of this 
including the privatization of electricity in India and the small privatization program in Russia 
where local governments often retained de facto control rights by retaining de jure ownership of 
the land on which newly privatized shops operated (see Barberis et al, 1996).
1  
                                                 
1 However, for a study of how governments relinquish control over time after privatizing and its consequences for 
performanace, see Boubakir et al (2005).   2
In this paper we argue that the privatization of the Russian oil sector during 1994-2003 is 
a useful case study of how governments use their control rights over strategic distribution assets 
during a privatization. Following the demise of the Soviet Union in the 1990s, the emerging 
Russian federal government gained jurisdiction over the major oil fields in Russia; and, it also 
retained control over the transport of oil exports from both Russia and many of the newly 
independent countries. Starting in 1994 many former state oil companies were privatized. This 
privatization has been partial because the federal government has obtained ownership positions 
in several companies and has also retained full control over the transport of oil onto lucrative 
world markets. In this paper, then, we seek to understand if the state effectively uses its control 
over the export pipeline to discriminate between fully privatized companies and those companies 
in which it has substantial ownership positions. And, we check whether government control over 
the oil export pipeline promotes or detracts from efficiency.   
The theoretical analysis in Grossman and Hart (1986) and then in Boycko, Shleifer and 
Vishny (1996) suggests that the federal government would tend to impose tight quotas and 
extract rents from companies over which it has limited influence (for herein state-independent 
firms) versus those over which it has influence (for herein denoted state-influence firms). The 
idea is that the federal government can hold up any company using its control over a key 
distribution asset, which in the case of the Russian crude oil sector is the transport pipeline. 
Companies are differentiated by their ownership rights over residual cash flows. There are fully 
private companies (e.g., Yukos) in which outsiders have full cash flow rights. There are other 
companies (e.g., LUKoil or Tatneft) where the federal government or some regional government 
have substantial or even close to full cash flow rights. When the federal government imposes 
quotas on enterprises over which it has some cash flow rights, it must also bear the financial   3
costs of this diversion of oil from lucrative world markets. This implies that the federal 
government is more likely to impose costly regulation on companies owned largely by outside 
investors and regional governments.   
In this paper we check for the differential treatment of state-independent versus state-
influence firms. We find that by 2003, in fact, state-influence firms have privileged access to 
state controlled export markets and that this privilege detracted from efficiency.  In particular, 
state-independent companies had to be much more productive than state-influence companies to 
receive comparable access to world markets; state-influence companies had preferential access to 
routes with more capacity; and, the allocation of route capacity was sensitive to transport costs 
only in the state-influence sector.  
 The rest of this paper is organized as follows. The next Section describes the evolution 
of ownership and structure in the Russian oil sector; Section 3 describes how the federal 
government controls transport of oil to world markets; Section 4 sketches a simple theory of 
partial privatization that generates the hypothesis that export allocations are tighter in state-
independent versus state-influence companies; Section 5 describes our data for testing this 
hypothesis; Section 6 presents our results about the differential treatment of state-independent 
versus state-influence companies; and Section 7 concludes. 
2.  Ownership and Structure  
This section describes ownership trends and structural dynamics in Russia’s crude oil 
sector. We develop a typology of company ownership based on state shares and federal 
government representation on company boards. We argue that Russian oil companies can be 
classified as either private, private with regional government influence,  private with federal 
government influence or state companies and that it is appropriate to refer to the latter two forms   4
of companies as state-influence companies. We also show that the expansion of state-
independent companies was more likely to be based on efficiency considerations than the 
expansion of state-influence companies. 
2.1 Ownership. Privatization of the oil sector was regulated by Presidential Ordinance 
#1403 approved on November 17, 1992 (President of Russian Federation, 1992). Vertically-
integrated companies (for herein, we will often use the Russian expression and call them 
“mothers”) were created by joining some oil-producing enterprises and refineries into open-stock 
companies
2. The shares of the newly-created mothers were distributed through several complex 
and frequently nontransparent auctions. The insiders who were allowed to participate in the 
bidding gained control over mothers with huge potential value in exchange for relatively small 
cash amounts (Megginson, 2005). Some of the smaller oil-producing enterprises were also 
transformed into open-stock companies and then later either became absorbed by a mother 
and/or had their stock allocations sold in an auction, or became joint ventures.  
The privatization of the oil sector mothers during 1997-2003 was partial because the 
federal government managed to maintain some substantial ownership positions. As is 
documented in Table 1, during 1997-2003 there were three types of vertically-integrated oil 
companies: those fully owned by outside investors, companies where the federal government had 
majority or substantial minority shareholder positions (denoted F in Table 1) and companies 
where regional governments had substantial ownership (denoted as R in Table 1). In 1997 only 
four of the thirteen mothers were fully owned by outside investors, seven companies were either 
fully or partially owned by the federal government and two were owned by regional governments 
                                                 
2 An open-stock company publicly trades its shares; a closed-stock company distributes its shares through closed 
subscription based on the decisions of the company’s founders.     5
(the Repubic of Tatarstan owned 30-% of Tatneft and the Republic of Bashkotorstan owned 63-
% of Bashneft).  
By 1999 the federal government had managed to preserve its significant ownership 
positions in the crude oil production sector; and, the federal government had also placed its 
representatives on the Boards of Directors (herein Boards) of the companies where it had 
ownership. In most of the cases, the federal government representatives were from the agencies 
that oversaw the oil sector. For example, LUKoil’s Board of 1999 included the Deputy Minister 
of Fuel and Energy, which at the time was responsible for allocating pipeline capacity for exports 
(see section 3). Another member of the Board was the top manager of the State Antimonopoly 
Committee, which had the responsibility of ensuring that large companies such as the oil mothers 
engaged in competitive business practice. Hence, federal representation on boards allowed the 
state not only to directly influence the mothers’ decisions, but also established connections 
between mothers and the federal agencies with substantial influence over the crude oil sector. 
The regional governments also had influence on decisions of the mothers in which they 
had substantial ownership positions. However, we found no evidence that the local governments 
had any connections to the federal agencies that supervised the oil sector. Moreover, the regional 
governments in Bashkortostan and Tatarstan were highly independent and often pursued policies 
that conflicted with federal rules (see Treisman, 1999). Thus, regional ownership and 
representation on the boards is not related to federal government influence.  
The above analysis suggests that we can refer to state-owned mothers and mothers where 
federal government had significant interest as state-influence companies. On the other hand, 
regionally controlled and entirely private companies are appropriately denoted state-independent   6
companies. In other words, “state” in “state-influence” and “state-independent” companies refers 
to the federal government. 
By 2003, federal government ownership in the oil sector had decreased. The federal 
government owned one vertically integrated company, Rosneft (responsible for 5% of total 
Russian production) and had a significant share of 7.6% in the biggest Russian oil producer 
LUKoil. It also had seats on the boards of these companies: ten representatives out of eleven in 
Rosneft and one representative out of eleven total in LUKoil. Thus, by 2003 the federal 
government still retained substantial influence over several major oil mothers.  
2.2. Structure. The oil sector has become more concentrated over time and there have 
been differences in expansion dynamics for the different mothers. By the late 1990s, the mothers 
started aggressively acquiring new subsidiaries, merging with other oil companies and/or buying 
out the stocks of other shareholders in the smaller oil producing stock companies. Some mothers 
expanded to new oil producing regions and some mothers exited. 
As a result of these expansions, Russian crude production and exports became more 
concentrated over time. By 2002, three firms (LUKoil, Yukos and Surgutneftegaz) were 
responsible for over 50% of total production and total exports: the 3-firm concentration ratio, R3, 
in production grew from 0.4 in 1997 to 0.51 in 2002; R3 in exports increased from 0.33 to 0.51 
between 1997 and 2002, respectively
3 (see Table 2).  
LUKoil, a state-influence company during 1997-2003, and Yukos, a state-independent 
company during 1997-2003, had the most aggressive expansion programs. Between 1997 and 
2003 LUKoil acquired 33 new subsidiaries and Yukos obtained five new subsidiaries, including 
                                                 
3 Concentration of Russian oil production sector is very high compared to other states where oil production 
is privatized. For example, in the United States, the third biggest oil producer in the world after Saudi Arabia and 
Russia, the 2-firm concentration ratio of oil production sector is 0.25; the three biggest US oil operators control only 
0.33 per cent of total oil production (EIA, 2005). 
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one mother (VNK). However, as Table 3 documents, the expansion programs were very 
different. LUKoil mostly expanded its influence to two new regions, Urals, an old oil region with 
relatively low productivity fields, and the North (Komi), a relatively new and poorly developed 
oil region. As a result, in 2003 productivity of the newly acquired subsidiaries varied from 1.63 
thousand tons per average well in the Urals to 8.5 per average well in Komi. Yukos, on the other 
hand, improved its existing position within Western Siberia, which is the most productive 
Russian oil region. As a result, between 1997 and 2003 Yukos’s average productivity in the 
region increased from 2.68 to 10.78 thousand tons per well. Table 4 documents that whether we 
use return on assets or return on non-current (primarily property, plant and equipment), between 
1999-2003 Yukos was more profitable than LUKoil. Thus, the evidence in Tables 3 and 4 
suggests that between 1997-2003 the expansion policy of the state-independent Yukos was 
driven more by profit criteria than the expansion policy in the state-influence company LUKoil. 
The expansion policies of the state-independent Sidanko and the state-influence company 
Rosneft are similar (we cannot make comparisons with other companies because either they 
change ownership between 1997-2003, and/or they do not expand). As Table 3 documents, 
Sidanko improved its productivity in Western Siberia from 2 to 7.4 thousand tons per well and 
its output in the less productive Volga region grew from 3.4 to 4.74 thousand tons per well. Fully 
state-owned Rosneft, on the other hand, started developing the new North region, where it 
achieved productivity of 28.47 thousand tons per well, while maintaining less productive 
subsidiaries in the worked-out North Caucasus region that produced on average 1.31 thousand 
tons of oil per well. 
In summary, this section has made several points about ownership and structure in the 
Russian oil sector. First, the privatization was partial and vertically-integrated companies in the   8
crude oil sector can be divided into state-influence companies and state-independent companies. 
Second, after privatization, the oil sector was highly concentrated and its concentration increased 
over time. Third, companies that remained state-independent used economic criterion in their 
expansions in 1997-2003..  
   
3.  Control   
In this section we argue that the federal government has the power to control exports 
because of its almost complete monopoly position as transporter of crude oil onto domestic-CIS 
and world markets. Because selling crude at world market is preferred to selling it domestically 
(due to substantial price spreads during 1997 and 2003 and non-payment problems in domestic 
and CIS markets), we argue that this ability to control exports gives the federal government 
considerable leverage over all companies. 
The profits of Russian oil mothers depend very much on their crude exports. As it is 
documented in Table 5, in 1997-2003 mothers exported on average about 20-35% of the total 
crude they produced; the state-owned Rosneft consistently exported the largest share of its 
production compared to other mothers. One reason for the reliance on exports was the significant 
spread between the domestic and world prices for crude oil. According to The Wall Street 
Journal in February of 2003, local oil spelling prices were as low as $5 per barrel, compared to 
$31 per barrel on the world market (Anna Raff for The Wall Street Journal, 2003.) Another 
reason for the reliance was that international buyers were more likely than customers in Russia 
and the CIS to pay in a timely fashion.   
Over 95% of total crude exports from Russia are transported through a system of trunk 
pipelines. The system is state-owned and operated by a 100% federally-owned company,   9
Transneft
4.  Hence, the federal government has almost complete monopoly control over Russian 
oil exports. This extent of federal power is unusual. In most countries where oil production is 
private, oil transportation is also privately provided. For example, in the United States the system 
of trunk pipelines is owned and operated by over 3, 000 companies, some of which are oil 
producers, others have no relation to oil production (Office of Pipeline Safety Communications, 
2005). This is also true for Norway where all the segments of its complex oil transportation 
system are operated by oil producers working in the country (Norwegian Petroleum Directorate, 
2005).  
According to independent experts, the Transneft pipeline system had in 2001 the capacity 
to ship roughly 153-154 million tons per year (Oil and Capital, 2001). Since 2002, Transneft 
trunk pipelines have been operating at full capacity (Oil and Capital, 2004). As a result of system 
overload, available throughput capacity has to be rationed between the companies. The federal 
government thus has tremendous control over the crude oil sector because of its ability to 
allocate highly valuable capacity to export.   
The export quotas allocation rules were introduced in 1994 and stayed practically 
unchanged through 2003 (Government of Russian Federation, 1994). According to the official 
laws on the books, export pipeline capacity is allocated between the oil companies according to a 
grandfathering rule: each company’s quota is determined by its production in the past quarter. In 
particular, the allocation quotas depend on three factors: the capacity of the Transneft system, the 
production of an exporter in the previous quarter and, since 1997, her tax arrears (Government of 
Russian Federation, 1997). This formal allocation rule does not depend on the willingness of oil 
producers to pay for capacity and so does not promote efficiency. The rules also appear to be 
                                                 
4 As of April, 2005, 100% of common stocks of the company belong to the Federal Agency of Federal Property 
Management (Transneft, 2005).   10
quite vague as to the exact relationships between past production, route capacity and current 
export access.  
Contrary to the unchanged allocation rules, the agencies enforcing them changed over time. 
Before 2000, the Ministry of Fuel and Energy and the Interdepartmental Commission (controlled 
by the Ministry of Fuel and Energy) were responsible for export transport allocations 
(Government of Russian Federation, 1995). The oil export allocation schedule was prepared 
quarterly by the Ministry of Fuel and Energy. It received information on the capacity of the 
transportation system and quotas requests of mothers from Transneft, and then sent the 
preliminary schedule to the Interdepartmental Commission for confirmation. The final schedule 
was then sent to Transneft and the mothers. 
The Ministry of Fuel and Energy was controlled mostly by former Soviet officials. 
Berkowitz (2000) documents that in 1995-1996 access to the oil pipeline was highly political. In 
particular, he noted that bribes and political favors played an important role in determining the 
size of the final quota. Furthermore, he also found that it is difficult to separate the impact of 
rules from the impact of the political influence that a company enjoys from being large on export 
allocations. 
In the spring of 2000, the Ministry of Fuel and Energy was restructured and became the 
Ministry of Energy, and the Interdepartmental Commission was dismissed (Government of 
Russian Federation, 2000). As a result of this restructuring, the Ministry of Energy lost a lot of 
its responsibilities to other state institutions. In particular, the main responsibility of quotas 
allocation was shifted to the specially created Commission of Russian Government (Government 
of Russian Federation, 2000) which now was controlled by one of the major players on Putin’s 
team, the Vice Prime Minister.    11
Allocating export quotas between the companies is not the only way the state can control 
the oil producers. It is important to mention that Russian crude can be exported through several 
routes that are differentiated by cost.  Thus, not only volume of the quota matters to a producer, 
but also WHERE this volume is allocated to be shipped. Specifically, Russian crude is exported 
through ports and the pipeline sub-system called Druzhba that delivers oil directly to European 
refineries (see Figure 1). Over half of the total Russian crude exports go through sea ports since 
exports through the Druzhba subsystem are constrained by the capacity of the European 
refineries to which it is connected.  In 1997 four ports were exporting Russian crude: Russian 
Novorossyisk and Tuapse, Ukrainian Odessa and Latvian Ventspils. By 2003 three more export 
ports appeared: Lithuanian Baltic export terminal Butinge
5 in 1999, Russian Baltic port Primorsk 
in 2001 and Ukrainian oil terminal “Yuzhnyi” in 2003.  
The export costs of different routes can be roughly estimated by using the costs of 
delivering oil to a refinery or a port and the costs of oil transshipment in the port. The costs of 
shipping oil are determined by the operators of the pipelines. Oil transshipment costs are 
separately determined in each port. They include costs of transferring oil from a pipeline to a 
terminal and then to a tanker. The export and transshipment costs at different export routers are 
presented in Table 6. The table shows that Transneft (the operator of the Russian pipeline 
system) offers the best transit tariffs and that working with non-Russian countries adds 
substantial costs. Hence, the Druzhba route to Europe is the cheapest since the producers only 
have to pay transit costs and avoid transshipment costs. However, because of the capacity 
constraints of the European refineries, this route may not be the most profitable since it allows 
exporting limited volumes of crude. Among the sea exporting terminals, Russian ports charge 
                                                 
5 Yukos bought control of Butinge in mid-2002 from the American company Williams (Oil and Capital 
News, 2002a; Oil and Capital News, 2002b). 
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relatively small transshipment costs. This makes Russian ports the most desirable among sea 
export routes.  
In summary, the Russian oil transport system can be characterized by the following 
features. First, exporting onto world markets is more lucrative than shipping onto the domestic or 
CIS market. Second, the Russian federal government has substantial leverage in the oil industry 
because it has a nearly monopoly position in allocating scarce transport capacity for world 
market exports. Third, the Russian federal government’s procedure for allocating export capacity 
is unrelated to efficiency criterion and is rather non-transparent. Fourth, the allocation rules did 
not change much in 1997-2003.  Finally, besides controlling export quotas, the federal 
government also controls just the allocation of company world market exports through particular 
export routes that are differentiated by their costs. Druzhba and Russian ports are the cheapest 
export routes for Russian crude, and shipping through non-Russian countries to obtain access to 
world markets adds substantial costs.  
 
4.  Theory  
This section develops a simple theory of just how differences in ownership can influence 
the state allocation of export quotas to companies. In our model, there is a state regulatory body 
that allocates export capacity, Q, in the form of access to a pipeline route to a company. In turn, 
the company chooses the share of its oil output that it exports on world markets and the share 
that goes to the domestic/CIS market. The world price exceeds the domestic/CIS price: Pw > Pd. 
This captures two features of the Russian oil market that we have already noted: first, world 
prices are usually higher and, second, many domestic and CIS refineries delay or simply   13
withhold payments while this is not an issue on world markets. Formally, a company solves the 
following program: 
where Q L f t s
L L f P P Max and L Choose d w
, ) ( . .
) 1 ( } ) ( ) ) 1 ( {( : ] 1 , 0 [ , 0
≤
− − + ∈ ≥
α
α α β α
 
L denotes a variable input such as labor, f(L) is a non-decreasing, continuous and concave 
production function that converts L into oil output, α is the share of output that is exported on 
world markets, (1-α) is the share shipped to the domestic-CIS market and Q denotes the export 
quota. The parameter β captures ownership; when β is close to unity the company has close full 
rights to it residual profits after choosing L, and is categorized as state-independent. As β falls 
and approaches zero the company has its most of its cash flows appropriated by the federal 
government and is classified as a state-influence company. 
  In this setup, when the export quota is non-binding, the company chooses α = 1 and 
exports all of its output to world markets. It also chooses L so that its marginal value product on 
world markets equals its marginal cost:  
  Q L f when and L f P w < = = *) ( , 1 * 1 *) ( ' α                   (2) 
  If the quota is binding, then Q = α*f(L) and the company sells (f(L) –Q) on domestic/CIS 
market. In this case, the shadow price of the quota is β(Pw – Pd), which is the company’s revenue 
simply lost by shifting a unit of output sales from the world to domestic-CIS market. The 
company now chooses L so that its marginal value product on domestic markets equals its 
marginal cost:  
*) / ( *) ( , 1 * , 1 *) ( ' α α Q L f and where L f P d = < =      (3) 
Equation (3) generates several predictions about the behavior of a quota constrained 
company. First, since cash flow rights apply to revenues net of variable costs, an increase in   14
ownership rights has no impact on output or allocations of output to the world and domestic/CIS 
markets: 
0 / * / * = ∂ ∂ = ∂ ∂ β β α L  
Furthermore, a relaxation of the quota induces a company to shift its sales from the domestic-CIS 
market to world markets without changing overall output: 
 0 / * , 0 / * = ∂ ∂ > ∂ ∂ Q L Q α  
We use this setup to make predictions about how the federal government regulatory 
agency chooses its optimal quota. Our basic premise is that the federal agency is driven by 
political criteria, and wins loyalty, favors and transfers in-kind when it has companies deliver 
cheap oil to its clients on the domestic-CIS market. To capture this idea, we denote the political 
benefits of quotas as Z(f(L) – Q), where Z’ > 0, Z’’ < 0. The cost borne by the federal 
government is the loss in revenues by diverting from the world market: (1 – β)(Pw – Pd)(f(L) – 
Q). Thus, the private ownership parameter, β, influences the federal government’s costs of using 
a quota to force a company to ship on the domestic-CIS market. The federal government can 
pass a higher share of its costs of foregoing world market prices to a state-independent company 
that has a β close to unity. However, in a state-influence company where β is much lower, the 
federal government picks up more of the cost.  
  When the quota is binding, the state chooses an optimal quota so that its marginal benefit 
equals its marginal cost: 
  0 ) )( 1 ( ' = − − + − d w P P Z β        ( 4 )  
Implicitly differentiating (4), then 
  0 ' ' / ) ( / < − = ∂ ∂ Z P P Q d w β        ( 5 )    15
Thus, a binding quota becomes tighter as private ownership increases. The logic of this result is 
that an increase in β depresses the marginal cost of diverting oil from the export to the 
domestic/CIS market. This result implies that the federal regulatory agencies would use their 
control over the oil export pipeline to discriminate against state-independent companies. We will 
take this prediction to the data in what follows.  
 
5. Data 
The data were acquired from Oil Trade, a statistical annex to Oil and Capital, a leading 
magazine for the Russian oil industry. Our dataset includes subsidiary level export volumes 
through different routes, measures of company size, regional production costs, transportation 
costs and the capacity of each pipeline route. In the dataset we report the exports of 32 
subsidiaries in 1997 and 54 oil subsidiaries in 2003 through each possible route (there are eight 
export routes, but because some routes are very close to each other, we categorize shipments into 
seven possible routes).  
5.1. Export Volumes. Export volumes are reported in thousands of tons, and there is a 
negligible difference in the quality of oil exported by the subsidiaries. This is because after a 
company pumps oil into the transport pipeline, that oil is blended with all of the oil currently in 
the pipeline, so that at the final export destination oil generally priced on world markets as the 
Urals blend.
6 In the dataset we included exports of only those subsidiaries of mothers that 
reported production in 1997 and 2003, and reported production was higher than reported exports. 
The reason to exclude exporting subsidiaries with no reported production or reported exports 
                                                 
6 The exceptions to this are exports from the Rosneft subsidiary in the Sakhalin area, which typically prices closer to 
Asian blends, and exports from companies using the Caspian Pipeline Consortium. However, these companies are 
excluded from our sample.  We thank Michael Cohen from the Office of Energy Markets and End Use, the 
Department of Energy, for help with this issue.   16
higher than production is the possibility that they exported re-distributed oil. Russian mother 
companies can re-distribute their output intended for export between the subsidiaries, i.e., a 
certain subsidiary may receive additional oil, produced by another subsidiary, for export. This re-
distribution does not change the receiving subsidiary’s production costs, but affects its 
transportation costs. Since it is impossible to tell how much extra oil the subsidiary received, the 
actual costs of the exporting subsidiary are impossible to calculate. There was one exporting 
subsidiary that did not report production in 1997 and four in 2003. One in 1997 reported 
significantly higher exports than production; and, in 2003 all of the subsidiaries’ exports were 
lower than reported production.    
5.2. Company Size.  We use subsidiaries’ number of total wells and number of operating 
wells as measures of its size. We find that both measures are highly correlated with total 
production: 0.79 for the number of total wells and 0.75 for the number of operating wells.   
Company size can pick up the importance of size for export access, which would include ability 
to produce and political influence. 
5.3. Company Productivity. We measure productivity as output per well and output per 
productive well. We would expect this variable to be positively associated with export access 
when access to world markets is based upon efficiency. 
5.4. Regional Production Costs. We use regional producers’ price (rubles per ton) as a 
measure of regional production costs. The oil-producing subsidiaries included in the dataset are 
located in six different oil regions of Russia. Regional prices capture the region-specific 
production costs that vary between different regions due to different climate zones (e.g., Western 
Siberia vs. Volga) and had different levels of oil production development (e.g., old and high cost 
wells in the North Caucasus region vs. new, poorly developed production infrastructure in the   17
North in the Komi Republic). We understand that this measure does not capture all company-
specific production costs, but it is the best measure available since the mothers do not report their 
production costs. If access to world markets is based upon economic criteria, then we would 
expect that this variable would be negatively associated with exports on world markets. 
5.5. Exports Routes. In 1997, Russian crude exports went through five routes (Druzhba 
pipeline sub-system; ports of Novorossiysk, Tuapse, Ventspils and Odessa); in 2003, the number 
of export routes for Russain oil was seven (Druzhba and ports of Tuapse, Novorossiysk, 
Primorsk, Odessa, Yuzhnyi and Butinge) (see Figure 1). We do not include the Yuzhnyi export 
route for 2003 since its exports account for less than 0.1% of total exports. Also, since Tuapse 
and Novorossyisk are located very close to each other, we unite these routes and report them as 
joint Tuapse-Novorossyik export route. For this route, we use total exports that went through 
both ports and total joint capacity of the two ports. The distance of this route is calculated as 
average of the distances from a subsidiary to each port.  
Thus, in the dataset we look at the total of four export routes in 1997 (Druzhba, Tuapse-
Novorossyisk, Ventspils and Odessa) and five export routes in 2003 (Druzhba, Primorsk, 
Tuapse-Novorossyisk, Odessa and Butinge). Below we describe how we use data on distance to 
world market on each route and tariffs to compute transportation costs. However, we also control 
for routes to pick up additional factors that would determine the impact of routes on export 
access.  
5.6. Transportation Costs. We have transportation costs for 2003 only. We measure 
transportation costs as dollars per ton per kilometer, i.e., tariff times the distance from the 
subsidiary’s location to the point of exit onto world markets. The tariffs per ton/km of different 
routes as of 2003 are given in Table 6. We use distance in km from a subsidiary to ports or points   18
of exit as a measure of distance from a subsidiary to a particular export point. Distance in km 
was defined by the shortest route from a subsidiary allocation to a port or Russian border (in case 
of Druzhba) along Transneft trunk pipelines. The location of a subsidiary was approximated 
either by location of its most productive fields or by location of its office. The information on the 
most productive fields was taken from mother companies’ websites; the office addresses were 
obtained from the website of the Russian System of Full Information Disclosure and News 
“Skrin” (http://www.skrin.ru). 
The data on the pipeline routes location was taken from Transneft’s website 
(www.transneft.ru).  To calculate distance between cities where the pipeline nodes are located, 
we used the AutoTransInfo website (http://www.ati.su/) that provides information on distances 
between Russian cities and towns along highways.  We assume that the oil from a subsidiary 
enters the pipeline at the node-city that is closest to the location of the subsidiary. If the 
allocation of export capacity is related to efficiency considerations, then we would expect to 
observe a negative association for subsidiaries between export volumes on a particular route and 
transportation costs.   
As a robustness check, we also use an alternative distance measure. Following Berkowitz 
(2000), alternative distance is measured in total numbers of Transneft regional sub-systems the 
subsidiary has to pump its oil through to get to the port or Russia border. The two measures are 
highly correlated (0.84).  
5.7. Route Capacity. Route capacity is reported for 2003 only. Capacity of each export 
route is reported in million tons per year in Table 6. For the Tuapse-Novorossyisk route we use 
the sum of the capacities of the two ports. Since the export system is capacity constrained, we 
would expect to observe a positive association between route capacity and export volumes.     19
5.8.  Additional controls. As additional control variables, we use route and mothers 
dummy variables. As previously noted, route dummy variables pick additional factors related to 
access besides transport costs and capacity, which could include long term relationships between 
a subsidiary and a particular regional Transneft company. Mother dummies pick mother-specific 
factors such as political connections that could be important for access. 
 
6.  Empirical Results 
We have compiled detailed data on export volumes by route, regional costs, company 
productivity and size in 1997 and 2003. Additionally, in 2003 we have detailed data 
summarizing transportation costs and route capacity. Hence, we first test the prediction that the 
federal regulatory agencies provide preferential access to state-influence companies in 2003 
only. Then, we will perform a less detailed analysis of 2003 and 1997 data and compare the 
results. We will show that in 2003 the state-influence companies indeed received preferential 
treatment, while in 1997 there was no difference in access provided to state-influence and state-
independent companies.  
6.1. Analysis of 2003. We set the indicator variable S = 0 for the state-independent 
companies and S = 1 for the state-influence companies and estimate the following model in 
2003: 
i
i i
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Here 
i pm y denotes thousands of tons of oil exported to world markets on the p
th pipeline 
route for the i
th subsidiary in the m
th mother company, reg_costs
i m  denotes regional production   20
costs for the i
th subsidiary of the m
th mother, trans_costs
i pm  denotes transportation costs (dollars 
per km per ton) for the i
th subsidiary of the m
th mother on the p
th route, route_capp  denotes the oil 
volume capacity for the p
th route, prod
i m   denotes productivity (measured as output per well) of 
the i
th subsidiary of the m
th mother, oil_wells
i m  is the number of oil wells (either total or 
operating) in the i
th subsidiary of the m
th mother and is our proxy for company size, routep is a 
dummy variable for the p
th route and motherm is a dummy variable for the m
th mother. The odd-
numbered regressors,  j 1 9 7 5 3 1 , , , , , γ α α α α α measure the estimated impact of reg_costs
i m , 
trans_costs
i pm ,  route_capp,  prod
i m ,  oil_wells
i m ,,  routep  and  motherm  on  
i pm y . The even 
numbered coefficients,  , , , , , , 2 10 8 6 4 2 j γ α α α α α measure the estimated differential impact of 
these variables on the state-influence net of state-independent sectors and enable to test the 
following hypotheses: 
Hypothesis 1: The state influence companies are not privileged because they cannot 
export more than the state-independents if their production costs are higher (the null is ) 0 2 = α . 
Hypothesis 2: The state-influence companies do not have privileged access to export 
routes because of their geographic location (the null is  0 4 = α ); 
Hypothesis 3: The state-influence companies do not receive better access to routes with 
greater capacity (the null is  0 6 = α ); 
Hypothesis 4: The state-influence companies do not receive privileged treatment because 
they cannot ship more than the state-independents if they are less productive (the null is  0 8 = α ). 
Our sample includes 270 observations of exports by 54 subsidiaries through the five 
possible routes. However, there are 145 observations in which a particular subsidiary that is an   21
exporter does not use at least one of the five available routes. Thus, we use the Tobit procedure 
and censor all the export observations that are zero. 
We test our hypothesis using the km distance measure (results with the alternative 
measure are similar and are available upon request). In Table 7 the columns entitled State-
Influence Net of State-Independent present the results relevant to our hypothesis tests (i.e., 
0 2 = α ,  , 0 4 = α 0 6 = α  and  0 8 = α ). In addition, the columns entitled State-Independent and 
State-Influence presents estimates of the associations between our independent variables and oil 
exports for the subsidiaries. In each cell we first report point estimates, standard errors (in 
parentheses) and then quantitative significance: this is the point estimate for a regressor times its 
sample standard deviation; it measures the impact of a one-standard deviation increase in the 
independent variable on thousands of tons oil exports.   
Checking column (1) in specifications 1 and 2, we fail to reject the hypothesis 
( ) 0 2 = α that the state influence companies are not privileged because of regional production 
costs. However, it is clear from columns (2) and (3) in each specification that only the state-
influence subsidiaries pay attention to regional production costs. A possible explanation of this 
finding is state-independents face tighter capacity constraints and will export as much as the 
federal government allows, while the state-influence companies can be more sensitive to costs. 
We reject the hypothesis ( 0 4 = α ) that the state influence companies do not have 
preferential access due to their location at 1 % level in both specifications. Once again, the 
estimates in columns (2) and (3) suggest there is a major difference in treatment of state-
independent versus state-influence subsidiaries. For example, the results in specification 2 imply 
that a one standard deviation increase in transport costs is associated with a 1.6 million ton cut in 
exports in the state-influence group and a 1.2 million ton increase in the state-independent group.   22
This suggests that the shadow price of the quota is so high for the state-independent companies 
that when state-influence companies reduce their exports following an increase in transportation 
costs, the state-independents pick up this slack capacity.  
We also reject the hypothesis ( 0 6 = α ) regarding access to the routes with better capacity 
at 1 % level in both specifications. The point estimates and the quantitative significance 
parameters are striking in this case. For example, in specification 2, a one-standard deviation 
increase in route capacity (roughly 20.8 million tons in exports per year) is associated with 
roughly 1.9 million tons in additional exports in the average state-independent subsidiary; the 
average state-influence subsidiary will export 8.3 million tons more. 
Finally, we reject the hypothesis ( 0 8 = α ) that there is no discrimination by subsidiary-
productivity per well at the 1 % level. What is striking is that state-independents  export more on 
world markets only if they are more productive while productivity does not matter for state-
influence subsidiaries.  
Thus, there is strong evidence that in 2003 state-influence companies and state-
independent companies are not treated in the same way in the export allocation system. The 
state-independent companies are more efficient, but have relatively limited access to export 
routes. Moreover, since the shadow price of the export quota is high, the state-independent 
companies are forced to behave inefficiently and export more when the transportation costs 
increase and extra export capacity frees up. These results also provide evidence that federal 
government control over the export pipeline is detrimental for efficiency. State-influence 
subsidiaries, on average, are less productive and yet get more access to pipeline capacity.  
6.2. Comparison of 1997 and 2003.  It is interesting to check if the federal government 
has changed in how it has exercised control over the pipeline. We have data that enables us to   23
make some rough comparisons between 1997 and 2003. This is interesting since the reformist 
Yeltsin government was in power in 1997 while the Putin administration was firmly in control in 
2003. As previously noted, we do not have the transportation costs and route capacity data for 
1997 that we have for 2003. Thus, to compare 1997 and 2003, we re-estimate equation (6) for 
2003 without transportation costs and route capacity variables and let route dummy variables 
pick up all the fixed effects of the routes. Since these independent variables are only slightly 
correlated with the production costs and uncorrelated with other independent variables (see Table 
8), the point estimates for the impact of productivity in 2003 should not be strongly affected; 
however, we do expect that the estimates for regional costs will change. 
Table 9 reports estimation results for 1997 and 2003 with number of total wells as a 
proxy of the companies’ size (the results with operating wells are similar and available upon 
request).  As expected, the point estimates for productivity per well in 2003 have not changed 
significantly compared to Table 7; regional production costs are changed but are not statistically 
significant. Consistent with our estimates from Table 7, state-influence companies have 
privileged access because state-independent subsidiaries must be more productive to get the 
same access to world markets. However, in 1997 there is no such discrimination between state-
influence and state-independent subsidiaries.  
This result suggests some changes in the Russian political situation between 1997 and 
2003. In 1997, Boris Yeltsin was in his second Presidential term and the privatization of the 
crude sector was only three years old. There were rumors that on the eve of the highly contested 
Presidential election between Yeltsin and the communist party, several oligarchs offered Yeltsin 
their financial support. Several of these oligarchs (for example, Yukos’s Khodorkhovsky and 
LUKoil’s Vagit Alekperov) owned substantial interests in state-influence and state independent   24
companies. After Yeltsin’s win in the summer of 1996, there were rumors that the oligarchs who 
supported Yeltsin received preferential treatment including access to under-priced blocks of state 
property.  
By 2003 the position of oligarchs in Russia had changed dramatically. The new President 
Putin was following up on his election promise to eliminate corruption. Many of the oligarchs 
who were influential in 1997 were in exile or arrested (for example, Khodorkhovsky). Putin had 
also replaced most of Yeltsin’s officials. In particular, in 2000 the authority to allocate export 
quotas was moved from the Ministry of Fuel and Energy to a new Committee headed by Victor 
Khristenko, Vice Prime Minister at the time. Our results are consistent with the interpretation 
that by 2003 the Putin administration toughened its treatment of oligarchs that operated state-
independent companies while providing concessions to oligarchs associated with state-influence 
companies.   
 
7.  Conclusion 
Subsequent to the financial crisis of 1998, GDP in Russia has grown at an impressive 
average annual rate of more than 6% (CIA World Fact Book, 2005). One of the major concerns 
with this growth record, however, is that it is driven primarily by high oil prices rather than deep 
structural reform (see Berglöf et al, 2003). In this paper we have documented that the Russian oil 
sector, which is one of Russia’s most profitable sectors, is in need of substantial restructuring. 
Our results show that the partial privatization imposes major inefficiencies for several reasons. 
First, state-influence companies appear to adopt acquisitions policies that are driven by non-
economic criterion. Second, the allocation of pipeline capacity is sensitive to transportation costs 
for state-influence enterprises, but it ignores these costs for state-independents. Third, state-  25
influence companies benefit more from increased capacity of the export routes. Finally, 
productivity is not important for access to the export pipeline for the state-influence companies.  
Furthermore, the Russian federal government continues to influence the oil sector in 
ways that are of concern. In October 2003, the Russian federal government arrested Mikhail 
Khodorkovsky, the chairman of the management committee of Yukos; this was the beginning of 
a process by which this state-independent mother company was radically downsized. Most 
notably, in 2005 Yukos’s biggest productive subsidiary was sold at roughly 60-percent of its 
market value to the state-owned mother company Rosneft. In October 2005 the state-owned 
natural gas monopoly Gazprom bought the state-independent mother Sibneft. Our analysis of oil 
transport during 1997-2003 provides evidence that partial privatization in fact has allowed the 
federal state to impose major distortions on the operation of a lucrative sector. We plan to 
analyze developments between 2003 and 2005 in future research.   
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Table 1: Evolution of Corporate Governance: 1997, 1999 and 2003 
 
1997 1999  2003 
Mothers  Share of the State 
 
Share of the State 
 
Representatives of Russian 
Government on BOD 
Share of the State 
 
Representatives of Russian 
Government on BOD 
LUKoil 
26.6
0 
(F) 
26.2
1  
(F) 
3 out of 11  
(F) 
7.60
2 
(F) 
1 out of 11  
(F) 
Yukos  0
3 0
3 0  0
4 0 
Sibneft  0
5 0
5 0  0
6 0 
Surgutneftergaz  0
7 0
7 0  0
8 0 
Sidanko  0
9 0
9 n/a  0
10 0 
Tatneft 
30.34
11 
(R) 
30.9
11a 
(R) 
5 out of 15 
 (R)  0
12  5 out of 15  
(R) 
Onako 
85 
13 
(F) 
85 
13 
(F)  n/a  Does not exist  Does not exist 
VNK 
36
14 
(F)  Does not exist  Does not exist  Does not exist  Does not exist 
TNK 
49.87
15 
(F) 
49.87
15a 
(F)  n/a 0
16 0 
Bashneft 
63
17 
(R) 
63
17 
(R) 
4 out of 14  
(R) 
1.34
18 
(R) 
3 out of 9 
 (R) 
Rosneft 
96.25
19 
(F) 
96.25
19 
(F)  n/a  96.25
20 
(F)  10 out of 11 (F) 
Slavneft 
77.1
21 
(F) 
77.1
21a 
(F) 
7 out of 12  
(F)  0
22 0 
KomiTEK 
21.7
23  
(F) 
1.07
23a  
(F)  n/a  Does not exist  Does not exist 
Russneft  Does not exist  Does not exist  Does not exist  0
24 0 
 
Notes: R denotes a regionally owned company and F denotes a federally owned company, and no notation means outside ownership 
0 Vedi (Analytical Laboratory). http://www.vedi.ru/s_pe/pe5101_r.htm 
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Table 2: Concentration of Russia Oil Production and Exports, 1997-2003 
    1997 1998 1999 2000 2001 2002 2003 
Share of Mothers   0.89 0.87 0.83 0.87 0.87 0.90 0.88 
R2  0.29 0.29 0.30 0.35 0.35 0.38 0.36  Production 
R3  0.40 0.41 0.41 0.47 0.47 0.51 0.49 
Share of Mothers   0.69 0.46 0.78 0.80 0.85 0.90 0.88 
R2  0.24 0.18 0.29 0.31 0.35 0.38 0.35  Exports 
R3  0.33 0.22 0.41 0.42 0.47 0.51 0.47 
Rn -- n-firm concentration ratio 
 
 
Table 3. Subsidiaries and Average Well Productivity 
1997 2003 
Region Mothers 
# of Producing 
Subsidiaries 
Reported 
# of 
Wells 
Average 
Production 
per Well
(thousand 
tons) 
# of Producing 
Subsidiaries 
Reported 
# of 
Wells 
Average 
Production 
per Well
(thousand 
tons)  
LUKoil  1  
(4 subdivisions)  15227 2.87  7 
(+4 subdivisions)  16352 6.11 
Yukos  1  10006 2.68  5  12101 10.78 
VNK  2 3879  2.84  - -  - 
Sibneft  1  6869 2.64  1  7997 3.93 
Surgutneftegas1   14133  2.40  1   16964  3.18 
Sidanko  5  6837 2.00  3  3737 7.40 
TNK 3  9614  2.33  4  13277  2.55 
Rosneft  1   2195  2.04   2  2525  3.90 
Slavneft  2  3599 3.41  6  3944 6.78 
Western 
Siberia 
Russneft -  -  -  2  1168  2.80 
KomiTEK  1 1609  2.23  - -  - 
LUKoil -  - -  11  3264  8.50  North 
Rosneft -  - -  2  139  28.47 
LUKoil  2  1067 3.08  2  1071 20.43 
Yukos  1  5462 1.56  1  5609 2.20 
Sidanko  1  339 3.70  1  380 4.74 
Tatneft  1 
 (14 subdivisions)   20711 1.18  1 
 (14 subdivisions)   21477 1.15 
Rosneft  1 166  1.50  - -  - 
Volga 
Russneft -  -  -  2  184  2.47 
North 
CaucasusRosneft  4  4529 1.37  5  3753 1.31 
LUKoil  1  4670 1.21  5  6257 1.63 
Sidanko  1  4448 1.27  2  4004 1.84 
Onako  2 2773  2.70  - -  - 
Bashneft  1 
 (10 subdivisions)  16958 0.91  1  
(10 subdivisions)  18505 0.65 
Urals 
TNK -  -  - 2  2885  102.50 
Far East  Rosneft  1  2263 0.66  1  2320 0.71   32
 
Table 4: Profitability of LUKoil versus Yukos 
 
Return on Assets  Return on Non-Current Assets 
Year  LUKoil Yukos  LUKoil Yukos 
1999 9.6% 20.4%  12.4%  31.4% 
2000  22.4% 41.0% 32.4% 77.5% 
2001  11.4% 33.2% 16.7% 80.0% 
2002 8.8% 24.6%  12.4%  52.0% 
2003  10.6% 21.6%*  15.0% 37.8%* 
 
  *The figures for Yukos in 2003 are calculated through September 2003 and are based on an un-audited interim 
report.  
 
  Notes: Return on assets (non-current assets) in year is net income at the end of the year t divided by the average 
value of assets (non-current assets) on December 31 of year t and year t-1. Non-current assets equity include (most 
importantly) the net value of property, plant and equipment; it also includes equity investees and long-term 
investments at cost, deferred income tax assets and other long term assets.   
  Sources: For Yukos, see http://www.yukos.com/New_IR/Financial_reports.asp 
 and  http://www.yukos.com/New_IR/Financial_reports_archive.asp and download the YUKOS Oil Company U.S. 
GAAP Consolidated Financial Statements, from December 31, 2002, December 31, 2001, and December 31, 2000 . 
We also used (for 2003) the YUKOS Oil Company U.S. GAAP Interim Condensed Consolidated Financial 
Statement Setpember 30, 2003, which is an un-audited report that covers the first nine months of 2003. For LUKoil 
see  http://www.lukoil.com/static_6_5id_210_.html and download the OAO LUKOIL Consolidated Financial 
Statements (prepared in accordance with US GAAP) As of December 31, 2002 and 2001; As of December 31, 2000 
and 1999 and for each of the years in the three year period ended December 31, 2000; and As of and for the years 
ended December 31, 1999 and 1998 
   33
 
Table 5: Exports of Crude Oil as Share of Production 
 
Mothers  1997 1998 1999 2000  2001 2002 2003 
Rosneft  0.47 0.36 0.40 0.23  0.19 0.19 0.44 
LUKoil  0.26 0.23 0.30 0.16  0.17 0.17 0.36 
Surgutneftegas  0.34 0.13 0.33 0.17  0.18 0.18 0.34 
Yukos  0.26 0.25 0.44 0.19  0.20 0.18 0.34 
Sidanko  0.26 0.19 0.25 0.12  0.14 0.16 0.31 
Slavneft  0.24 0.12 0.33 0.17  0.18 0.19 0.32 
VNK  0.25 0.19 n.a. n.a.  n.a. n.a. n.a. 
Onako  0.24 0.19 0.26 0.07  n.a. n.a. n.a. 
TNK  0.16 0.21 0.31 0.23  0.18 0.17 0.38 
Sibneft  0.26 0.26 0.31 0.16  0.18 0.20 0.36 
Tatneft  0.24 0.12 0.31 0.20  0.19 0.18 0.38 
Bashneft  0.22 0.14 0.32 0.16  0.17 0.17 0.31 
KomiTEK  0.24 0.36 0.41 n.a. n.a.  n.a.  n.a. 
Russneft   -  -  -  -  -  -  0.41 
AVERAGE PER 
MOTHER  0.27 0.21 0.33 0.17  0.18 0.18 0.36 
TOTAL 
MOTHERS  0.27 0.20 0.33 0.18  0.18 0.18 0.35 
 
Notes: n.a. means that these companies do not exist in a particular year.   34
Table 6: Costs of Export Routes for Russian Oil Producers, 2003 
 
Source:   
1 Transneft, 2002. 
               
2 Marine Tariff Center. http://www.russianports.ru/novo/Tarif/35_p.htm; 
                                                     http://www.russianports.ru/tuap/Tarif/52_p.htm 
               
3 Oil and Capital, 2000. 
               
4 Ventspils Nafta, 2000. 
               
5  Caspian Energy, 2003. 
 
6 Energy Information Administration, 2005. 
 
7 Oil and Capital, 2003a. 
 
8 Transneft, 2003. 
  9 Oil and Capital, 2003b. 
 
10 Odessa Matine Port. http://www.port.odessa.ua/od199.php  
 
11 Oil and Capital, 2002. 
 
12 Mazeikiu Nafta.  http://www.nafta.lt/en/content.php?pid=18 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Port/Route 
Pipeline 
Route to 
Port/Refinery 
Average Transit Tariff  
($ per ton/km) 
Port Transshipment Tariff 
($ per ton) 
Capacity of 
the 
Route/Port 
(mln tons 
per year) 
Druzhba 
 (till  Russian 
border) 
Russia   .33
1 - 62
6 
Novorossyisk  Russia .33
1 2
2 45.3
7 
Primorsk  Russia .33
1 n/a  30
8 
Tuapse  Russia .33
1 2.4
2 20
9 
 
Odessa 
Russia-
Ukraine 
Through Russia: 
Through Ukraine:   
Average Tariff : 
.33
1 
.44
1 
.39   
n/a 24
10 
Yuzhnyi  Russia-
Ukraine 
Through Russia: 
Through Ukraine:   
Average Tariff : 
.33
1 
.44
1 
.39   
3.5
5 n/a 
Ventspils 
Russia-
Byelorussia-
Lithuania-
Latvia 
Through Russia: 
Through 
Byelorussia:  
Through Lithuania:   
Through Latvia:          
Average Tariff : 
.33
1 
.64
3 
.9 
3 
.6 
3 
.62 
 
4.7
4 50
11 
Butinge 
Russia-
Byelorussia- 
Latvia- 
Lithuania 
Through Russia: 
Through 
Byelorussia:  
Through Latvia:          
Through Lithuania:   
Average Tariff : 
.33
1 
.64
1 
.71
1 
.99
1 
.67 
 
n/a 14
12   35
Table 7:  Oil Exports in State-Independent and State-Influence Subsidiaries. 
Dependent Variable Is Tons (000s) of Oil Exported by Route and Subsidiary in 2003 
 
Specification 1  Specification 2 
1 2  3  1 2  3 
Independent 
Variables 
 State-
Influence 
Net of State-
Independent 
State-
Independent State-
Influence 
 State-
Influence 
Net of State-
Independent 
State-
Independent State-
Influence 
Regional 
Costs 
 
-2.37 
(1.581) 
-773.40 
0.42 
(1.558)   
138.26 
-1.95** 
(0.537) 
-631.57 
-2.40 
(1.623) 
-780.52 
0.37 
(1.599)  
121.07 
-2.02** 
(0.544) 
-655 
Transport 
Costs for 
Pipeline 
Route 
-3.39**    
 (0.976) 
-2540.51 
1.34    
(0.846) 
1004.02 
-2.05** 
(0.539) 
-1525.56 
-3.71**  
(1.017) 
-2783.79 
1.61* 
(0.867) 
1204.60 
-2.10** 
(0.544) 
-1565 
Pipeline 
Route 
Capacity 
263.89** 
(77.598) 
 5485.40 
80.32** 
(27.159) 
1669.22 
344.20** 
(94.67) 
7152.29 
309.87** 
(86.552) 
6439.97 
90.21** 
(28.684) 
1874.86 
400.08** 
(104.918)  
8314 
Productivity 
-22.26** 
(6.068) 
-2012..08 
22.28** 
(5.894) 
2013.36 
0.01* 
(1.25) 
1.29 
-19.13** 
(5.486) 
-1743.33 
19.20** 
(5.299) 
1740.98 
0.07 
(1.254) 
6.4 
Additional 
Controls 
Total wells, five pipeline routes and the 
eleven mothers 
Operating wells, five pipeline routes and the 
eleven mothers 
Log 
Pseudolikeli-
hood 
-1153.54 -1153.91 
 
Notes: Results are base on a maximum likelihood estimation of a Tobit model where the dependent 
variable is censored at zero. All standard errors are adjusted for heteroskedasticity. There are 270 
observations and ** denotes significance at the 5-% level and * denotes significance at the 10-% level. 
Productivity is output per well in Specification 1 and output per operating well in Specification 2.   36
Table 8: Correlation Coefficients 
 
 
Regional 
Production 
Costs 
Number of 
Wells 
Number of 
Producing 
Wells 
Production 
per Well 
Production 
per 
Producing 
Well 
Transportation 
costs  -0.30 -0.01  -0.02 -0.08  -0.08 
Route 
Capacity  0.00 0.00  0.00 -0.00  -0.00 
 
 
 
 
Table 9: Oil Exports in State-Independent and State-Influence Subsidiaries, 1997 and 2003 
Dependent Variable Is Tons (000s) of Oil Exported by Route and Subsidiary 
 
2003 1997 
Independent 
Variables   State-
Independent 
State-
Influence Net 
of State-
Independent 
State-
Independent 
State-
Influence Net 
of State-
Independent 
Total Wells 
(100s) 
67.35** 
(17.7) 
-37.29** 
(17.6) 
47.62*    
(28.3) 
-38.26     
(28.3) 
Operating Wells 
  X  X X X 
Regional Costs 
 
-1.34 
(1.037)   
0.36 
(1.114) 
48.04 
(74.98) 
-44.88 
(75.01) 
Productivity 
 
18.95** 
(5.482) 
-18.63** 
(5.750) 
-60.97 
(249.47) 
74.82 
(293.15) 
Additional 
Controls 
Five pipeline route used by mothers 
including Druzhba, 
Tuapse&Novorossiysk, Odessa, Butinge 
and Primorsk, differentiated by state-
independent and state-influence 
companies; eleven mothers 
Five pipeline route used by mothers 
including Druzhba, 
Tuapse&Novorossiysk, Odessa, Butinge 
and Primorsk, differentiated by state-
independent and state-influence 
companies; eleven mothers 
Log 
Psuedolikelihood 
-1160.74 -533.30 
Notes: Results are based on a maximum likelihood estimation of a Tobit model where the non-negative 
dependent variable is censored at zero. All standard errors are adjusted for heteroskedasticity. There are 
270 observations for 2003 and 108 observations for 1997. ** denotes significance at the 5-% level and * 
denotes significance at the 10-% level. Productivity is output per well.    37
Figure 1. Export Routes for Russian Crude Oil. 
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  CODE 
1:  Primorsk  5, 6:  Odessa, Yuzhnyi 
2: Ventspils  7: Novorossyisk 
3: Butinge  8: Tuapse 
4: Druzhba      
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